Opinion: India-Pakistan wars — Indira-Modi, Nixon-Trump

Opinion: India-Pakistan wars — Indira-Modi, Nixon-Trump

President Richard Nixon sought to play the grand strategist whereas Donald Trump seemed to relish the role of a showman. The difference was not merely in ideology or policy — it was in the very style of American engagement with South Asia

Published Date – 15 May 2025, 08:41 PM


Opinion: India-Pakistan wars — Indira-Modi, Nixon-Trump


By Vanam Jwala Narasimha Rao

Two pivotal moments in US diplomacy during the 1971 and 2025 India-Pakistan conflicts, under President Richard Nixon and President Donald Trump respectively, reflect contemporary world history. Nixon’s strategic, albeit pro-Pakistan stance, as opposed to Trump’s erratic and self-aggrandising approach, unmindful of diplomatic finesse, are typical politico-diplomatic studies. Nixon backed Pakistan, not out of affection for Yahya Khan but ostensibly as a Cold War strategy. There was a technique to his manoeuvring that was in tune with the American political style of strategic calculation masked behind blunt diplomacy.


Fast forward, Trump’s reaction to the India-Pakistan flare-up was less strategic and more self-referential. Declaring that he prevailed over both sides to ensure a ceasefire, Trump was more like a showman seeking applause. His words and manner lacked the seriousness expected of an American approach to a nuclear-sensitive region. It was a departure from mature diplomacy.

Indira and Nixon

Indira Gandhi, facing Nixon, stood firm and led India to a historic humanitarian and military success. Narendra Modi, in contrast, had to navigate Trump’s unpredictability with utmost caution and restraint, responding less to Washington’s commands and more to regional and domestic imperatives. The contrast is unambiguous.

Unfriendly Nixon represented a strategic America. Claiming neutrality, Trump disengaged from history and was oblivious to regional complexity. The former’s conduct, however contentious, was in line with institutional statecraft. The latter’s statements revealed a disturbing personalisation of foreign policy.

Both India and the US have since evolved. The 1971 war cemented India’s regional dominance. The 2025 episode revealed the limits of ‘performative diplomacy’ in serious conflict zones. Juxtaposing two geopolitical moments across time by comparing not only leaders but also their political styles and the evolution of diplomacy is a challenging commentary, especially in the exact Nixon-Trump, Indira-Modi, 1971-2025 framework.

A comparative frame contrasting Nixon and Trump’s handling of the India-Pakistan crises while analysing the differing Indian responses under Indira and Modi is a research subject. Similarly, to bridge two distinct historical periods (Cold War and post-globalisation), pit two different diplomatic styles (strategic and performative), link internal political strength (Indira and Modi) to external handling, and evaluate US leadership through the lens of Indian strategic interest are equally worth researching.

In December 1971, as Indian tanks rolled through East Pakistan and Bangladesh was being born, a deeply anguished Indira Gandhi wrote to Nixon. The New York Times, on Dec 17, 1971, under the heading ‘Mrs Gandhi Writes to President: US Could Have Averted War’ reported that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had written to President Nixon that the war between India and Pakistan could have been avoided had the US used its power, influence and authority to achieve a political solution to the crisis in East Pakistan.

Juxtaposing two geopolitical moments by comparing not only leaders but also their political styles is a challenging commentary, especially in the exact Nixon-Trump, Indira-Modi, 1971-2025 framework

Gandhi wrote that despite advice that she gave in August to Henry A Kissinger, the President’s adviser on National Security Affairs, only ‘Lip Service was paid to the need for a political settlement.’ She said she was writing at a time of deep anguish over the ‘Unhappy turn which relations between India and the United States have taken.’ ‘India was deeply hurt,’ she wrote, ‘by the innuendoes and insinuations that it was she who had precipitated the crisis and had in any way thwarted the emergence of solutions.’

In what was taken here as an allusion to Nixon, Indira Gandhi continued, ‘I do not know who is responsible for this calumny.’ She asked Nixon to ‘At least let me know where precisely we have gone wrong before your representatives or spokesmen deal with us with such harshness of language.’ She said ‘India did not want to acquire any Pakistani Territory for herself in the war.’

‘We seek nothing for ourselves. We do not want any territory of what was East Pakistan and now constitutes Bangladesh. We do not want territory of West Pakistan.’ She said India wanted only lasting peace with Pakistan. ‘But will Pakistan give up its ceaseless and yet pointless agitation of the last 24 years over Kashmir?’ she asked. ‘Are they willing to give up their hate campaign and posture of perpetual hostility toward India?’

Cut to 2025

Half a century later, in 2025, though history did not repeat, it did echo, albeit in a different register. Another India-Pakistan conflict erupted, and another US President, Trump, chose to insert himself into the narrative. But unlike Nixon’s ‘Cold War Practical Politics’ which, while problematic, was grounded in strategic calculation, Trump’s approach was markedly personal, performative and disturbingly unserious.

The Nixon administration’s tilt toward Pakistan in 1971 was not incidental. It was deliberate, and an extension of Washington’s attempt to open diplomatic relations with China, using Pakistani President Yahya Khan as an intermediary. Indira Gandhi’s efforts to warn Washington about the escalating humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, including her detailed discussions with Henry Kissinger, were met with platitudes and inaction. The US was not only indifferent to the genocide in East Pakistan but was willing to apply military pressure on India to protect its authoritarian ally.

Contrast this to Trump’s behaviour. In the heat of rising tensions between India and Pakistan, Trump took to social media and televised interviews to announce that he had personally ‘prevailed upon both sides’ to agree to a ceasefire. The statement, far from reassuring, appeared detached from reality and seemed designed more for domestic applause than geopolitical stability. There was no strategic doctrine, no serious mediation effort, and no appreciation of the historical or regional stakes.

Where Nixon sought to play the grand strategist, however cynically, Trump seemed to relish the role of a showman. The difference was not merely in ideology or policy. It was in the very style of American engagement with South Asia. Nixon may have stood against India’s immediate interests, but he did so with a clear understanding of power, alliance and consequence.

India of 2025 seeks recognition and respect. Trump appeared to understand little of the region’s complexity and reduced a high-stakes moment to a personal branding exercise. What Nixon did in secret war rooms, Trump broadcast in real time on global platforms.

1971 and 2025

For India, the difference between 1971 and 2025 is equally instructive. Indira Gandhi, faced with a hostile superpower and a genocidal neighbour, stood her ground with a mixture of resolve, clarity and moral conviction. Her letter to Nixon was not a plea, it was a protest couched in the language of diplomacy. Her leadership during the Bangladesh Liberation War remains one of India’s finest hours.

Narendra Modi in 2025, confronted a different challenge. The world is no longer bipolar where forces are organised around two rival powers, and India is no longer a regional underdog. The unpredictability of Trump’s words and the lack of institutional clarity from the US forced New Delhi into a cautious, almost reluctant engagement. Modi had to weigh his responses carefully, navigating a world where the US foreign policy may change with a tweet and where personal rapport counts more than protocol.

(The author is a senior journalist)

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